The Netherlands had recently developed a new strategy for the eradication of foot and mouth disease (FMD). When FMD was confirmed in Great Britain and France, recent imports of susceptible animals from these countries were traced and preventive measures were taken. On 21 March 2001, FMD was confirmed in the Netherlands. The disease was introduced by calves which became infected at a staging post in Mayenne, France, where infected sheep from Great Britain were present.
Introduction
In Great Britain, foot and mouth disease (FMD) was first confirmed on 20 February 2001. The alarm was immediately raised throughout Europe. European Union (EU) member states and the European Commission (EC) took measures to prevent spread of the disease (2) . Despite these measures, FMD spread to Ireland, France and the Netherlands.
The Netherlands had been free of FMD since 1984. Prophylactic vaccination was abolished in all EU member states in 1992.
A contingency plan for FMD eradication as prescribed by EU Directive 85/511 was prepared in the early nineties, but this plan was updated, based on experience gained during the major outbreak of classical swine fever (CSF) (hog cholera) (1) , A.M. Akkerman (1) , P. van der Wal (2) , A. Dekker (3) & A. Bianchi (3) (1) Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, P.O. Box 20401, 2500 EK Den Haag, the Netherlands This paper describes the preparation for FMD eradication, the precautionary measures taken after the first outbreaks were reported in Great Britain and France and the eradication measures including the emergency vaccination and the screening of the affected areas. Information is also given on reactions from the farming community and the general public during the eradication programme.
Preparation
The Netherlands had suffered from a large outbreak of CSF in a very densely populated pig producing area, which started in February 1997 and lasted until May 1998 (8) . The contingency plan which had been implemented for CSF outbreaks was an appropriate guideline for the organisation of the eradication at the beginning of the outbreak, but proved insufficient for the size and magnitude of the problems as these developed in the first weeks of the epizootic. The practical experiences learned from this outbreak provided the basis for a new strategy for CSF eradication and were set out in very detailed hand-books with instructions for all the parties involved.
An outbreak of FMD affecting more species would have had an even more dramatic effect in a country with an animal density as high as the Netherlands. Hence, a new strategy for FMD had to be developed for the country. As a first step, a project group including virologists, epidemiologists, government and private veterinarians involved in disease eradication, drafted a document containing recommendations for preventive and eradication measures. This draft was discussed with representatives of all relevant organisations of farmers, trade, meat and dairy industry, etc. Recommendations and suggestions from these discussions were incorporated in a revised draft document. This document was discussed within the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries and finally, a definitive proposal (6) was sent to Parliament where the measures were discussed and adopted.
The strategy included the following:
-preventive measures when FMD is present in a neighbouring country, such as a ban on the collection of susceptible animals, extra cleaning and disinfections of lorries and other vehicles for animal transport returning from that country, inspection on farms where animals from the infected country had been delivered recently -measures on and around suspected farms, such as clinical inspection by expert teams, blocking of the farm, transport ban in the suspected area, diagnostic confirmation -measures when the first case of FMD is confirmed in the Netherlands, including a total ban on all transport of animals throughout the country for at least 72 h, closing of markets, collection centres, slaughterhouses; special hygiene requirements for feed delivery to and milk collection from farms; banning of visits to farms -culling of the cloven-hoofed animals on the affected farm within 24 h of confirmation of FMD -pre-emptive culling of all susceptible animals on all farms in contact with the affected farm and on all farms within a radius of 1 km around an affected farm; this culling should be completed within 4 days of detection of the disease -slaughtering of animals on the farm; drastic hygiene measures to prevent spreading the disease from those farms -if, due to lack of slaughtering capacity or processing capacity for the slaughtered animals, the above-mentioned deadlines could not be met, vaccination of animals on farms to be culled pre-emptively should be applied as soon as possible.
Vaccinated animals should be killed as soon as the required capacity is available. Fourteen days after vaccination, the animals are sufficiently protected to limit virus spread and to allow transport to a slaughtering facility located within the surveillance zone -epidemiological information can indicate the need for vaccination in a wider area -as soon as tracing has identified where the disease might have spread to, the total ban on transport can be lifted in areas considered free of risk; in general, 72 h after the confirmation of the first case, but if necessary, after a longer period -the country is then divided into compartments. Transport contacts between farms are limited to only one compartment.
This strategy was designed and presented in detail in handbooks for all personnel involved in the eradication and related activities. Most hand-books were completed in the summer of 2000.
The National Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat (RVV) is responsible for the organisation and implementation of the eradication. Personnel of the RVV was trained to recognise contagious diseases, the internal organisation was adjusted, software had been developed for the administrative support and contracts had been made with suppliers for a variety of materials and equipment. A plan for rapid vaccination was prepared.
Measures taken after the first report of foot and mouth disease in Great Britain
When the first report on the FMD outbreak in Great Britain was received, the following action was taken immediately:
-all imports from the United Kingdom (UK) and Northern Ireland of live susceptible animals which had reached the Netherlands after 24 January 2001 were traced -pigs on farms where animals had been imported from the UK were examined clinically. If a period of 30 days had elapsed after the arrival of these animals, blood samples were taken for serological testing. Seven farms were blocked until FMDfreedom was established -on farms where sheep or deer had arrived from the UK, all FMD-susceptible animals were pre-emptively culled. Blood samples from these animals were also tested. Such a drastic step was taken because the symptoms of FMD are generally difficult to detect in sheep and deer. A total of 2,826 sheep, 662 deer, 711 cattle, 512 pigs and 2 lamas were slaughtered on eleven farms. None of these animals appeared to be infected after serological testing -all collections of susceptible animals were prohibited, so markets and collection centres were closed, transport of cattle and pigs was allowed directly to a slaughterhouse or to another farm -transport of sheep and goats was banned -all lorries used for the transport of animals imported from the UK had to be cleaned and disinfected in an officially supervised facility.
Measures taken after the detection of foot and mouth disease in France
When the first outbreak of FMD was reported in France on 13 March 2001, the same measures as described above for animals imported from the UK were taken on farms that had imported cloven-hoofed animals from France after 1 February 2001.
Forty-nine farms with imported cattle or pigs were examined in the same way as the farms with pigs imported from the UK. Animals on three farms with sheep or goats from France were culled. All 52 farms were found to be negative to FMD tests.
The disease was approaching the Netherlands, the Channel had been crossed and the farming community and politicians became increasingly worried about the risk that the disease should enter the Netherlands. For this reason, on 13 March 2001, all transport of susceptible animals was prohibited throughout the country.
Suspicion of foot and mouth disease
On 15 March 2001, a veterinary practitioner reported clinical symptoms of FMD on a mixed milking goats and veal calf farm in Oene, Province of Gelderland. The RVV specialist team sent to this farm concluded that some of the goats had fever, acute lameness and small blisters in the mouth, on the teats and on the coronary bands of the feet. However, laboratory tests with this material were negative in the antigen-detection enzymelinked immunosorbent assay (ELISA The following decisions were taken immediately:
-culling of the susceptible animals on the affected farms -implementation of a protection zone of 3 km around the affected farms and a surveillance zone of not less than 10 km around the affected farms -pre-emptive culling of all susceptible animals on farms with a dangerous contact with one of the affected farms -pre-emptive culling of all susceptible animals on farms within a radius of 1 km around the affected farms -tracing forwards and backwards -screening of all farms in the protection zones -stand-still of all animal movements throughout the country for at least 72 h -national ban on all exports of animals and animal products. These data gave rise to the conclusion that case 2001/3 was probably the index case.
Origin of the infection
Pre-emptive culling 
Vaccination conditions and areas
European Directive 85/511 prohibits prophylactic vaccination against FMD, but allows emergency vaccination (1). Vaccination was performed from outside the 2-km circle inwards. Pre-emptive culling was practised on the farms adjacent to the affected farms. When the vaccination teams reached these adjacent farms, the culling was stopped. In the 2-km zone, all susceptible animals on those farms were then either vaccinated or culled.
On 1 April 2001, 12 FMD-affected farms had been reported. Figure 1 gives the location of these farms, the 2-km vaccination zones and the border of the surveillance zone. On that day, the situation was evaluated with epidemiologists. The conclusions of this evaluation were as follows:
-the disease was spreading more rapidly and was more dispersed than expected -difficulties had been encountered in tracing contacts with affected farms; there were obviously many more dangerous contacts between farms than farmers mentioned in the interviews -the impression was that the disease could not be contained with the strategy applied -vaccination in a larger area was found to be necessary.
It was decided to apply vaccination to the entire area between the IJssel River and the forests of the Veluwe. Both form natural borders, i.e. a large river on the eastern side with a forested zone on the western side. Railway lines were chosen as northern and southern borders. This vaccination area was called the 'Noord Veluwe' (Fig. 2) .
This plan was discussed with the EC. A draft decision was discussed in the SVC and a positive response was obtained.
This Commission Decision 2001/279 came into force on 5 April 2001 (4).
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This decision allowed a choice between two options, as follows:
-suppressive vaccination with the effect that all vaccinated animals had to be slaughtered -protective vaccination.
Protective vaccination implied that all vaccinated pigs, sheep and goats should be slaughtered, but the vaccinated cattle could be kept alive. Milk of these cattle could be processed (treatments in conformity with OIE rules) and then traded within the EU. Thirty days after vaccination, the meat of the vaccinated cattle could be traded freely in the EU after maturation (pH below 6) and deboning (OIE requirements). The vaccinated animals had to remain in the vaccination zone for at least 12 months. Around the vaccination zone, a buffer zone of at least 10 km should be maintained for 12 months. This regime was the same as that for a surveillance zone.
These options created a dilemma in that dairy farmers could live with the conditions for protective vaccination. They were allowed to retain their valuable animals and their commercial disadvantage was limited. However, for pig, sheep and goat farmers, the situation was the opposite. Vaccinated animals had to be slaughtered, restocking of these farms would be difficult and farmers in the buffer zone would face lengthy restrictions on their products because these were excluded from EU trade.
Before taking a decision on this dilemma, the Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries asked the National Farmers' Organisation (LTO), the Organisation for the Meat Trade (COV) and the Netherlands Dairy Organisation (NZO) for advice. These organisations indicated a preference for suppressive vaccination. One week after the preference was indicated through the EU Commission Decision, the Minister selected this option. than 100 km from the main infected area (Fig. 3) . The relation between these outbreaks and the others has not been found. Some contact with a farm in the Oene area was assumed but this was not proven.
Equipment for the vaccination teams was delivered by companies who had a contract with the RVV to maintain an adequate stock for immediate supply.
Serum samples were taken before the animals were vaccinated. All susceptible animals were vaccinated. Vaccinated animals were marked with an indelible mark (a punch in one ear). Thus, vaccinated animals could be recognised with ease.
After vaccination, the animals were left on the farm. Milk from dairy cows and goats was delivered to the dairy industry and processed under the required conditions. Fourteen days postvaccination, the vaccinated animals were transported to one of four designated slaughterhouses where they were killed. These slaughterhouses only operated as killing stations. If there was sufficient capacity available, carcasses were delivered directly to a rendering plant for destruction and incineration. When insufficient processing capacity was available, the carcasses were divided into smaller pieces, which were temporarily stocked in designated cold stores. Later, all the stored meat was rendered and incinerated.
Blood samples were taken from the slaughtered animals for further epidemiological evaluation. These samples will be tested with several available discriminatory antibody ELISAs for non-structural proteins (NSPs).
In total, 186,645 animals were vaccinated on 1988 farms. The last vaccinated animal was slaughtered on 25 May 2001.
Final screening
The final screening of the protection and surveillance zones was conducted according to Commission Decision 2001/295 with extra serological screening of young cattle (5).
For the protection zone this included the following:
-visits of all farms for clinical inspection and administrative control -on farms with sheep, goats and young cattle (up to 2 years of age) serological screening was also performed. Sampling was based on a sample size to detect a within-herd prevalence of 5% (with 95% confidence).
In the surveillance zone the following regime was applied:
-visits of all farms for clinical inspection and administrative control -visits of 150 randomly selected farms for serological sampling. The number of farms was based on a protocol to detect a between-herd prevalence of 2% (with 95% confidence). Sampling of each herd was performed on a sample size to detect a within-herd prevalence of 5% (95% confidence). 
Vaccination provisions
The Government of the Netherlands has an agreement with the Institute for Animal Science and Health ID-Lelystad to keep a permanent stock of FMD antigen for emergencies. This stock consists of 1 to 2 million doses of nine different FMD strains. The agreement guarantees that within 4 days, 500,000 doses of formulated monovalent vaccine can be supplied. Thereafter, every 3 days, a further 500,000 doses will be supplied until the antigen stock is depleted.
When it was evident that the UK outbreak was caused by the pan-Asian lineage of serotype O and that the vaccine strain O 1 Manisa would provide good protection, a formulated stock of 500,000 doses of monovalent double oil emulsion O 1 Manisa vaccine was reserved, ready for use in an emergency in the Netherlands.
The vaccine was therefore available at the time the decision to apply vaccination was taken.
During the final screening, six animals on six farms were found to be FMD-positive by ELISA and the virus neutralisation test (VNT). In one case, no serological positive samples were found at re-sampling. In three cases, only one animal was positive on re-sampling, so this was a singleton reactor. The seropositive animals were culled. In two cases, the sampled cows were born before 1990 and had been vaccinated before prophylactic vaccination had been abolished.
Reactions of the farming community
In general, the farmer organisations were happy with the relatively rapid eradication of FMD. Many dairy farmers, however, were not convinced that the killing of their animals was justified. Several of them tried to prevent the culling of their vaccinated cattle through court cases against the Government. The judges ruled against the claims of the farmers in all the court cases, but these attracted much attention from the press and influenced public opinion.
Large numbers of sheep and goats are kept as pets. These animals are often not registered and are difficult for the RVV to detect. Many of these owners also resisted and tried to prevent the culling of their animals.
In the surroundings of the only affected farm at Kootwijkerbroek, several farmers doubted the positive result of the laboratory test. The laboratory invited some spokesmen of this group of farmers and explained the laboratory procedures and results. Nevertheless, many of them could not be convinced of the results.
Other farmers suspected that the owner of the affected farm had introduced the disease deliberately. No proof of this was found.
These uncertainties caused massive resistance against the culling in this area. Special duty police with armoured cars were required to facilitate the work of the culling teams. Despite these measures, several culling activities had to be postponed and the RVV teams performing their work were molested or taken hostage. Several cars and lorries belonging to these teams were damaged.
A minister of religion organised a non-stop church service on a farm where the animals had to be culled. He claimed that the law prohibited police and the RVV teams from interrupting the service.
The interested parties and their lawyers were very creative in finding arguments against the decisions the Government had to take within the framework of EU legislation.
Some retired scientists who had worked in FMD research supported the farmers in court.
Reaction of the public
During the CSF outbreaks between 1997 and 1998, the public in the Netherlands was frequently confronted with televised pictures of slaughtered animals. During that period, more than 10 million healthy animals were slaughtered to eradicate the disease or to solve animal welfare problems on overstocked farms. Resistance against these eradication techniques increased.
The feelings were even stronger during the FMD outbreak. The slaughtering of sheep, lambs, goats and cattle to eradicate a disease provokes greater emotion than when this occurs in pigs.
The public does not accept that trade consequences prevent the use of vaccine for eradication purposes. Most human diseases are prevented effectively by protective vaccination and vaccinated people are not prohibited from travelling worldwide.
In this context, it is very difficult to convince the general public of the necessity to apply stamping-out as the ultimate measure in animal disease eradication.
This feeling will make it very difficult for the Government to apply the same strategy again in the Netherlands should FMD reoccur.
Eradication measures not only affect the agricultural community, but also have far-reaching consequences for most economic and social activities in the endangered areas.
Conclusions and lessons
The transport limitations and the ban on the assembling of animals at markets and collection centres, measures which were taken in the Netherlands when FMD was detected in the UK, limited contacts between farms and thus the spread of FMD before the disease was confirmed.
The controls on farms in the Netherlands with recent imports from FMD-infected countries, including the pre-emptive culling of animals on farms with imported sheep, did not demonstrate introduction of FMD virus. However, in France, serologically positive sheep imported from the UK were detected and an outbreak of FMD was confirmed near a farm where these sheep were present. These facts demonstrate the need for this type of measure.
Staging posts where animals are unloaded in order to rest during long-distance transport do not always guarantee the preservation of the disease status of the transported animals.
The first case of FMD was detected at a relatively late stage, which is an increasingly frequent experience. The disease can then spread to other farms. This risk is higher in a country densely populated by susceptible animals such as the Netherlands. When several secondary outbreaks are confirmed within a short period, it is difficult to apply a stamping-out policy rapidly enough to contain the disease.
Emergency vaccination was very effective in containing the FMD epidemic rapidly.
As soon as animals receive adequate protection from vaccination, they can be transported to a culling station without the risk of spreading the virus. The culling of these herds can be performed more efficiently in a centralised killing facility within the infected area, such as a slaughterhouse.
It was difficult or impossible to convince farmers and the public of the necessity to slaughter vaccinated animals which were perfectly healthy and protected from developing the disease (they were not protected from infection). Politicians and the public at large are very strongly opposed to large-scale slaughtering of vaccinated animals in a future outbreak of FMD.
At present, discriminatory tests based on NSPs, such as the 3ABC ELISA, that are now becoming available need to be used in herds of animals vaccinated in emergencies to separate infected herds from non-infected animals. Infected herds should be culled. Herds that have been found to be negative with the 3ABC ELISA should be considered safe. When all herds in the vaccination area can be considered safe on the basis of these tests and a selective culling policy, there is no justification for restrictions on international trade in products derived from the remaining farms in the vaccination zone. Dans le chapitre du Code zoosanitaire international consacré à la fièvre aphteuse, l'OIE devrait inclure le contrôle des animaux vaccinés à l'aide d'épreuves discriminantes fondées sur la recherche des protéines non structurales du virus. Resumen Los Países Bajos habían recién elaborado una nueva estrategia de erradicación de la fiebre aftosa cuando se confirmó la presencia de esta enfermedad en Gran Bretaña y Francia. A partir de ese momento se rastrearon las importaciones de animales susceptibles efectuadas en los últimos tiempos desde ambos países y se adoptaron medidas preventivas. El 21 de marzo de 2001 se confirmó la presencia de la enfermedad en los Países Bajos, introducida por terneras que se infectaron al coincidir durante una escala en Mayenne (Francia) con ovejas infectadas procedentes de Gran Bretaña. Se registraron casos de fiebre aftosa en un total de 26 explotaciones. Se decidió proceder a una vacunación supresora, lo que significaba que debían sacrificarse todos los animales vacunados. Aunque el procedimiento habitual fue la aplicación de vacunaciones perifocales a los animales susceptibles en un radio de 2 km alrededor de los rebaños infectados, en Noord Veluwe fue preciso cubrir un área más extensa. El 22 de abril de 2001 se confirmó el último caso de explotación infectada. La campaña de vacunaciones de emergencia había servido pues para contener el brote de fiebre aftosa con rapidez. El 25 de mayo de 2001 se sacrificó el último animal vacunado. Muchos ganaderos, poniendo en duda la necesidad de sacrificar sus ejemplares vacunados sanos, intentaron sin éxito poner trabas a esa medida. En la eventualidad de que surgiera un nuevo brote de fiebre aftosa, la clase política y el gran público se oponen ahora con firmeza al sacrificio a gran escala de animales vacunados. En el capítulo del Código zoosanitario internacional dedicado a la fiebre aftosa, la OIE debería prever la posibilidad de controlar los animales vacunados mediante pruebas de detección de proteínas no estructurales.
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